Medicaid Expansion, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the Supreme Court\u27s Flawed Spending Clause Coercion Reasoning in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius by Weeden, L. Darnell
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2013
Medicaid Expansion, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and the Supreme Court's
Flawed Spending Clause Coercion Reasoning in
National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius
L. Darnell Weeden
Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
L. Darnell Weeden, Medicaid Expansion, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the Supreme Court's Flawed Spending Clause






MEDICAID EXPANSION, THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND 
THE SUPREME COURT’S FLAWED SPENDING 
CLAUSE COERCION REASONING IN NATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. 
SEBELIUS 
L. DARNELL WEEDEN* 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1051	  
 II. FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE PRIOR TO SEBELIUS, THE 
SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS THEORY TO ANY ACTUAL CASE AS A 
VIOLATION OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE .......................................... 1054	  
 III. THE IMPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND 
OTHER UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUES FOR AVOIDING THE 
ENDLESS JUDICIAL DIFFICULTIES OF RESOLVING THE MEDICAID AND 
SPENDING POWER COERCION ISSUE PRESENTED IN SEBELIUS ........ 1056	  
 IV. THE COURT IN SEBELIUS INCORRECTLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS BY USING A TENTH AMENDMENT STATES’ 
RIGHTS RATIONALE TO CONCLUDE THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION 
PLAN WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL COERCIVE EXERCISE OF THE 
SPENDING POWER .......................................................................... 1064	  
 V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD APPLY THE RATIONAL BASIS 
TEST FOR DECIDING WHETHER CONGRESS CREATED AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL COERCIVE CONDITION IN VIOLATION OF THE 
SPENDING POWER BY REQUIRING A PARTICIPATING STATE TO ACCEPT 
REASONABLE FEDERAL CHANGES THAT PROMOTE THE GENERAL 
WELFARE ....................................................................................... 1068	  
 VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 1073	  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue to be addressed is whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s (ACA or “Obamacare”)1 manifest goal of promoting the general welfare of the 
                                                            
* Professor, Thurgood Marshall School Of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., 
University Of Mississippi. This Article was supported by a 2013 summer research grant from 
Texas Southern University Thurgood Marshall School of Law. I give a special word of thanks 
to my wife and children for their reliable encouragement. I would also like to thank my former 
Research Assistant, Attorney Brenda Dang, a member of the Texas Bar, J.D. 2012, for her 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
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nation by encouraging states to expand their existing Medicaid plans2 is a coercive 
use of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause3 if the federal government 
permanently picks up at least 90 percent of the cost of the expansion. The Spending 
Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general 
Welfare of the United States.”4 To make certain that federal money given to the 
States is used to promote the general welfare of the people in a manner consistent 
with the intent of Congress, it is necessary for Congress to have the power to place 
restrictions on the States’ expenditure of federal dollars.5  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius dramatically changed the Medicaid 
expansion authority of Congress and unnecessarily created a confusing spending 
power coercion landscape for courts and others trying to determine the impact of 
Sebelius for any future attempt by Congress to expand or otherwise modify existing 
Medicaid legislation.6 The Supreme Court should reverse its Medicaid holding in 
Sebelius and return to the position it adopted more than seventy-five years ago: 
Refusing to place unreasonable limits on the use of the spending power by 
Congress.7 Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court moved away from placing Tenth 
Amendment restrictions on the Spending Clause Power granted to Congress, which 
had the practical effect of authorizing Congress to provide instructions on subjects 
traditionally managed by state governments, provided that Congress connected 
conformity with those federal instructions to the delivery of federal dollars.8 Since 
the states have the ability to simply refuse federal dollars, states have a reasonable 
choice of whether or not to embrace the instructions intended by the conditions 
established for those federal dollars, and as a result, the states have not lost any of its 
sovereign authority.9 In Sebelius, a state could avoid federal spending power 
coercion by not accepting the offer of federal dollars.10 In Sebelius, the Court finally 
acted on its warnings in South Dakota v. Dole that legislation enacted by Congress 
under the Spending Clause from the 1930s to 2010 was subject to affirmative 
                                                            
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). When mentioning the ACA, I write about the ACA as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 111-152. 
 2 ACA § 2001(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 4 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2633 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 5 Id.; see, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 6 Susan Feigin Harris, Healthcare Reform, the Supreme Court, and the Election: Is it 
Over Yet?, 50 HOUS. LAWYER 14, 17-18 (2013). 
 7 Reeve T. Bull, The Virtue of Vagueness: A Defense of South Dakota v. Dole, 56 DUKE 
L.J. 279, 283 (2006). 
 8 Id. at 283-84 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937)) (approving 
many sections of the Social Security Act that produced a very appealing enticement for states 
to set up their own unemployment compensation regulations). 
 9 Id. at 284 (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 596). 
 10 Id. (citing Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947)). 
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limits.11 Because all modern Spending Clause decisions before Sebelius validated the 
conditioning of federal dollars, Sebelius gave Congress explicit notice that its 
excessively coercive conditioning of Medicaid funds did not pass constitutional 
muster.12  
In Sebelius, one could simply conclude that Chief Justice Roberts provided 
notice to Congress that it may condition only a percentage of major federal funding 
upon compliance by a state without invading that states’ right of sovereignty. Chief 
Justice Roberts’ coercion notice to Congress in Sebelius is vague and flawed because 
it fails to provide an understandable constitutional line that Congress shall not 
cross.13 In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts wrote what will no doubt be regarded as 
extremely confounding language for healthcare policy makers, lawyers, scholars, 
and other interested parties endeavoring to understand the implication of the 
Spending Clause coercion rationale for future amendments to the Medicaid law.14 
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Roberts articulated the belief that the Supreme Court 
did not need to fix a recognizable line for determining when Spending Clause 
coercion violation occurred.15 Chief Justice Roberts appears to be approving 
arbitrary line-drawing on the Medicaid expansion issue by stating that, “[i]t is 
enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”16 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion concurring in Sebelius kept the Medicaid expansion 
provision from being held completely invalid. Justice Ginsburg posed an influential 
question regarding future Medicaid expansion: “When future Spending Clause 
challenges arrive, as they likely will in the wake of today’s decision, how will 
litigants and judges assess whether ‘a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept 
the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds?”17 Chief Justice Roberts’ very 
confounding language forces litigants and judges to determine the meaning of future 
amendments to the Medicaid law without any meaningful coercion criteria 
guidelines. I do not believe judges or litigants have a reliable set of criteria from the 
Supreme Court for assessing whether a state has a non-coercive choice in accepting 
federal requirements in exchange for federal money. 
Part II of this Article provides a concise contention from a historical perspective 
that the Supreme Court has consistently refused to apply the unconstitutional 
conditions theory to any actual case as a violation of the Spending Clause prior to 
Sebelius. Part III analyzes the implication of the political question doctrine and other 
universal jurisprudential values for avoiding the endless judicial difficulties of 
resolving the Medicaid and spending power coercion issue presented in Sebelius. 
Part IV contends the Court in Sebelius incorrectly refused to give deference to 
Congress by using a Tenth Amendment states’ rights rationale to conclude the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion plan was an unconstitutional coercive exercise of the 
                                                            
 11 Id. at 303 (citing Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
643, 652 (1996)). 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. at 303-04. 
 14 Feigin Harris, supra note 6, at 19. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 19-20. 
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spending power. Part V asserts that the Supreme Court should apply the rational 
basis test for deciding whether Congress creates an unconstitutional coercive 
condition in violation of the spending power by requiring a participating state to 
accept reasonable federal changes that promote the general welfare. 
II. FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE PRIOR TO SEBELIUS, THE SUPREME COURT HAS 
CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS THEORY 
TO ANY ACTUAL CASE AS A VIOLATION OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court has virtually without fail respected Congress’ ability to 
provide instructions regarding spending conditions placed on federal grants, and the 
Court has insisted that States follow those instructions.18 The Medicaid program was 
produced in 1965, after Congress included Title XIX in the Social Security Act with 
the goal of giving federal financial assistance to States that decided to reimburse 
particular expenses for medical treatment for needy people.19 During the last fifty 
years, the Supreme Court has refused to place unnecessary restrictions on the ability 
of Congress to provide instructions for the Medicaid program, but the Court changed 
all that in a significant way in its June 28, 2012 Sebelius opinion.20  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sebelius rejects the Court’s prior approach in 
approving the federal/state accommodating schemes for the Medicaid program.21 
The cornerstone of the federal/state Medicaid accommodating scheme is financial 
payment by both the Federal Government and the sharing State.22 Nothing in Title 
XIX as originally enacted, or in its legislative history, suggests that Congress 
promised a participating State that subsequent legislation by Congress could not 
require a participating State to assume the responsibility of expanding the pool of 
needy individuals eligible for health services in its Medicaid plan.23 It is very clear 
that the purpose of Congress in enacting Title XIX and the ACA was to give federal 
financial support for all legitimate state payments under an approved Medicaid 
plan.24 Under the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, a 
participating State that fails to expand its Medicaid Plan as required under the ACA 
is no longer an approved Medicaid plan and therefore, is not entitled to any federal 
funding for any portion of its Medicaid plan.25 
As a matter of judicial precedent, the Supreme Court has specifically established 
Congress’ right to condition a State‘s acceptance of Medicaid dollars on submission 
                                                            
 18 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2633 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 19 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 
 20 Michael H. Cook & Jennifer L. Evans, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius—What Does it Mean to the Future of Medicaid and Healthcare Reform?, 6 J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 88, 91 (2013) (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566). 
 21 Id. at 92; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 22 McRae, 448 U.S. at 308. 
 23 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 89-404, pt. 1, at 83-85 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-213, at 72-74 
(1965); 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 309. 
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to the requirements Congress created for involvement in the program.26 While 
involvement in the Medicaid program is totally optional, once a State elects to play a 
part, it is obliged to comply with the terms of Title XIX or any other subsequent and 
reasonable amendment to the Medicaid law enacted by Congress while exercising its 
power under the Spending Clause.27 The Sebelius decision adopted an unprecedented 
position by severely restricting the federal government‘s power to enforce an ACA 
provision that encourages states to expand its Medicaid plans to become more 
inclusive by enlarging the beneficiary population also in need of help.28 
Before the 2011 Term, not a single Supreme Court judgment since the New Deal 
had invalidated any Congressional legislation as violating the spending 
clause.29More precisely, the specific issue of unconstitutionally coercive conditions 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Sebelius was unusual as well. As a matter of fact, 
not a single federal court had ever concluded that any federal legislation created an 
unconstitutionally coercive use of the spending power30 before the Court’s 
pronouncement in Sebelius.31 The only two Supreme Court cases discussing the 
spending power coercion policy concluded that it did not apply and held that the 
federal unemployment-compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 
were valid in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,32 and the Court also validated the 
drinking-age condition imposed on highway funds in South Dakota v. Dole.33 In 
those two cases, the Court accepted a hypothetical chance of a federal-spending plan 
to unconstitutionally coerce states. However, the court concluded that the factual 
evidence in the two cases demonstrated that actual coercion did not exist.34 Before 
Sebelius, spending clause coercion had been properly downgraded to that branch of 
case law involving dicta and theory.35  
                                                            
 26 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see McRae, 448 U.S. at 309.   
 27 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2633; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396f (1976). 
 28 Cook & Evans, supra note 20, at 91-92.  
 29 Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (citing Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1355 
(4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that the Court has not invalidated an Act 
of Congress under the Spending Clause since United States v. Butler, over half a century 
ago.”), rev'd en banc, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997)); accord Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 
1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Most of the treatment given the [coercion] theory in the federal 
courts has been negative.”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The 
coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, and 
never in favor of the challenging party.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1430-32 (1989)). 
 30 Id. at 3 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first time ever—finds an exercise of Congress' 
spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”)).  
 31 Id. (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality opinion)). 
 32 Id. (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-93 (1937)). 
 33 Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.  
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III. THE IMPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND OTHER 
UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUES FOR AVOIDING THE ENDLESS JUDICIAL 
DIFFICULTIES OF RESOLVING THE MEDICAID AND SPENDING POWER COERCION ISSUE 
PRESENTED IN SEBELIUS 
In Sebelius,36 the US Supreme Court tackled a complex constitutional law case 
by unfortunately allowing different worlds to inhabit the opinion: “one legal, one 
imagined, and one based in concrete facts about the real world.”37 Following one of 
the most time-consuming oral arguments in current Supreme Court history,38 the 
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that the 
penalty sections of the Medicaid expansion sections were unacceptably coercive, and 
the penalty section of the Medicaid extension section of the act may be severed from 
the ACA.39 Under the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Medicaid 
expansion requirement is a valid exercise of the spending power as long as Congress 
does not impose any penalty on any state currently participating in the Medicaid 
Program for rejecting the federal request for Medicaid expansion under the ACA.40  
Chief Justice Roberts judicial behavior toward the Medicaid expansion penalty 
created a spending power coercion world that was disconnected from federalism 
reality.41 The chief justice correctly concluded that the law involving federal grant-
in-aid projects has constantly indicated that the federal government conceivably 
could exceed its spending power limits and coerce a state hooked on federal dollars 
to engage in an activity that it would not have otherwise engaged.42 Because the 
intricacy of recognizing a difference between incentives and challenging 
arrangements from coercion is so problematic, the Supreme Court had never ever 
concluded that Congress had violated the coercion limit on the spending power.43 
Chief Justice Roberts’ application of the coercion doctrine to limit the spending 
power of Congress in Sebelius is completely original and dangerous. For the first 
time in United States history, the Court concludes that spending power coercion 
exists in a mutually accommodating federal grant-in-aid venture but it does not 
realistically provide guidance on how to establish the difference between coercion 
and inducement or negotiation and duress.44 The line of attack utilized by Chief 
Justice Roberts in avoiding these concerns strongly suggests that the Chief Justice 
has closed his eyes to the Medicaid statute, its ensuing enactment history, as well as 
                                                            
 36 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 37 Jerry L. Mashaw, Legal, Imagined, and Real Worlds: Reflections on National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 255, 257 
(2013). 
 38 Id. at 256. 
 39 Id. at 257. 
 40 Id. at 256-57. 
 41 Id. at 262. 
 42 Id. at 262-63. 
 43 Id. at 263. 
 44 Id. 
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earlier judgments rendered by the Supreme Court.45 One commentator has correctly 
concluded that Chief Justice Roberts’ rationale regarding the Medicaid expansion 
amendments and the coercion issue in Sebelius is extremely harmful and 
destructive.46 The rationale articulated by Justice Roberts encourages lower courts to 
discover coercion in whichever of the hundreds of state and federal mutually-
accommodating subsidized projects now in operation should Congress decide to 
adjust and make involvement in the adjusted program a condition of taking part in 
the program at all.47 Under the position taken by the Chief Justice, programs with 
settled expectations and popularity with state citizens would appear to be beyond 
amendment by Congress.48 “To be sure, lower courts will be able to avoid this silly 
result, if they want to do so. But the Supreme Court has given those courts no usable 
standard on which to distinguish coercion from bargain.”49 
I agree with the position that conflicting opinions of the Justices concerning 
Medicaid expansion and unconstitutional spending power coercion encourages a 
state to now presume that its programs with settled expectations and popularity with 
state citizens are now virtually beyond amendment by Congress. Since the Court 
failed to provide standards to distinguish coercion from bargain, any future warning 
from Congress advising a state that it does not intend to continue providing money 
for programs it previously funded may now give states a plausible basis to argue 
spending power coercion.50 Justices Ginsburg and her group of justices argued that 
the Medicaid expansion is constitutional as enacted.51 The Dissenting Justices 
contended that the entire Medicaid expansion section of the law was coercive and 
unconstitutional and could not be saved.52 The Court held that it would save 
Medicaid by denying DHHS the authority to withhold all of the existing Medicaid 
money.53 Under the Medicaid expansion approved by the Supreme Court those, 
states that choose not to participate in the expansion may be denied only the money 
intended to help them implement the expansion.54 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
concurred with the prevailing position to save a version of the Medicaid Expansion 
that is not consistent with the intent of Congress.55 The Sebelius decision prohibiting 
Congress from withholding existing Medicaid money as coercive declared the States 
as separate and independent sovereigns and is the most significant Supreme Court 
                                                            
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 265. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Maureen Mullen Dove, The Obamacare Decision: Does Anyone Know What it Means?, 
46 MD. B.J. 28, 30 (2013). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
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judgment up until now, describing the restrictive nature of Congress’ spending 
power.56 
Maureen Mullen Dove, a retired Deputy General of Maryland, provides an 
excellent, concise statement regarding the practical effect of the Court approving a 
limited version of the Medicaid expansion enacted by congress.57As a practical 
matter, the real impact of the Sebelius Medicaid expansion holding will be on State 
budgetary choices.58 “The decision dramatically reduces the pressure for States to 
accept the Medicaid expansion or other federal grants. Its effect will also limit 
Congress’ ability to direct State implementation of other jointly funded programs by 
threatening withdrawal of federal funds.”59 However, Justice Ginsburg believes 
Congress could severely limit the state budgetary choices by simply repealing the 
existing Medicaid project and establishing a new version to include new people in 
need.60 If Justice Ginsburg’s theory is correct, the petitioning States might be 
thwarted; however, it is not likely that Congress will be able to implement Justice 
Ginsburg’s theory to create new health care legislation in the future to expand 
coverage for poor adults because of the harsh reality of partisan politics.61  
Although I agree that Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning is not clear and provides 
no significant criteria by which to determine coerciveness, I believe the future 
impact of the opinion is fairly easy to predict.62 As a result of Roberts’ reasoning, 
everyone may easily predict that there will be many legal challenges to the Medicaid 
expansion analysis.63 Chief Justice Roberts’ Medicaid expansion coercion theory is 
seriously flawed because it is vague and fails to adequately identify either the total 
sum or proportion of federal money at risk of being denied or the standard to 
properly measure when substantive changes to the Medicaid program actually create 
unconstitutional coercion.64 Chief Justice Roberts’ coercion rationale in Sebelius 
demonstrates that he has joined those Circuit courts which have consistently 
demonstrated an inability to apply Spending Clause doctrine to the federal healthcare 
projects in a significant way.65  
In the lower federal court cases, states claim that participation in Medicaid is 
involuntary coercion because a state’s medical arrangement would collapse without 
federal Medicaid money are not new and have been consistently rejected66 before 
Sebelius. A state’s involuntary-participation coercion Medicaid theory that is based 
                                                            
 56 Id. at 32. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Contra id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for 
States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 453 (2008). 
 66 Id. at 457. 
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on the allegation that a state could simply not afford to lose its federally-funded 
Medicaid programs was consistently rejected by the lower federal courts,67 but 
accepted by the Supreme Court in Sebelius. In West Virginia v. U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services,68 a Fourth Circuit decision concerning a Tenth 
Amendment dispute regarding the “estate recovery” conditions that were attached to 
the Medicaid plan in 1993 by Congress, the appellate court correctly acknowledged 
that the limit of the Spending Clause power does not allow Congress to manipulate 
pressure into compulsion.69 However, the Fourth Circuit rejected West Virginia’s 
claim that the estate recovery section was coercive and prohibited by the Tenth 
Amendment.70 While recognizing that conjecture regarding spending power coercion 
existed because of dicta in Dole, the Fourth Circuit concluded in 2002 that the 
Supreme Court failed to give reliable direction on the boundary between influence 
and compulsion, thus several courts have demonstrated judicial restraint by treating 
spending power coercion as a political question.71 
The political question doctrine involves an intermingling of conditions under 
which courts correctly consider whether a specific issue in litigation is justiciable—
to be precise, whether the question is right and proper for judicial resolution by 
courts.72 The purpose of the political question doctrine is to implement the separation 
of powers doctrine.73 Because of Article III, the separation of powers doctrine 
requires courts to give relevant deference to the other co-equal branches of the 
federal government when exercising those constitutional powers assigned to the 
courts.74 In Baker, the Supreme Court recognized six situations in which a question 
may put forward a political question:  
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.75  
                                                            
 67 Id.  
 68 West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 69 Huberfeld, supra note 65, at 459. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 459-60 (citing West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 289). 
 72 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1431 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 73 Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
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Baker instituted the standard that if one of these factors is present, the case could 
be dismissed as a political question.76 According to Justice Sotomayor, “Baker left 
unanswered when the presence of one or more factors warrants dismissal, as well as 
the interrelationship of the six factors and the relative importance of each in 
determining whether a case is suitable for adjudication.”77 I believe a functional 
application of the Baker factors to the Medicaid Expansion issue presented in 
Sebelius presents appropriate plausible justifications for refusing to give judgment 
on the merits of the spending power dispute between a state and the federal 
government. The utilization of one or more of the six Baker factors under the 
problematic political question doctrine in order to justify denying a state its 
requested remedy in Sebelius is not required and should not be required under the 
rationale of Professor Henkin.78  
According to Professor Louis Henkin, “The ‘political question’ doctrine, . . . is 
an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established doctrines that has misled 
lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never put there and make it far more 
than the sum of its parts.”79 Nevertheless, Professor Henkin contends the political 
question doctrine possessed some universal jurisprudential values, and only 
confusion is created by giving those universal values special treatment in preferred 
cases.80 Professor Henkin argues that existing universal jurisprudential values 
contained in the following five suggestions renders the confusing political question 
doctrine unnecessary: 
1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political branches 
within their constitutional authority. 
2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the 
political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe any. 
3. Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights and 
standing to object in favor of private parties. 
4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity. 
5. In principle, finally, there might be constitutional provisions which can 
properly be interpreted as wholly or in part “self-monitoring” and not the 
subject of judicial review.81 
Professor Henkin’s five suggestions demonstrate how the court in Sebelius could 
have denied a state its requested remedy to be exempt from the Medicaid expansion 
requirement without suffering the penalty of losing all of its Medicaid funding 
without utilizing or recognizing the political question doctrine. First, in Sebelius, the 
Court could have refused to hear a state’s Medicaid Expansion challenge because the 
Spending Clause grants Congress the power to provide for the general Welfare of the 
United States, and Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 allows Congress to use this power to establish the 
                                                            
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Louis Henkin, Is there a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597, 621-22 
(1976). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 622-23.  
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type of cooperative state-federal agreement created under the ACA’s Medicaid 
Expansion program.82 Second, in Sebelius, the Court could have avoided hearing the 
ACA Medicaid challenge because the Constitution does not recognize a spending 
power violation by a Congressional mandate that a state which would like to 
continue receiving federal Medicaid dollars must now promote the general welfare 
of its poor citizens under the ACA by offering them an opportunity to receive 
healthcare coverage. Since the Spending Clause does not preclude the Secretary 
from withholding Medicaid funds as authorized by Congress based on a state’s 
refusal to comply with the expanded Medicaid program, the Court has refused to 
grant a state its requested remedy. Third, in Sebelius, the Court could have refused to 
hear the ACA Medicaid challenge because the Constitution does not limit or prohibit 
Congress from offering an individual or a state a fair and reasonable opportunity to 
receive or reject all of its Medicaid Funds. Fourth, in Sebelius, the Court could have 
rejected the ACA Medicaid Expansion litigation because a state seeking a remedy 
has failed to make a case for equity in seeking to maintain its Medicaid dollars while 
not meeting the new reasonable and under-the-circumstances conditions for 
continuing federal dollars. The equity rationale for rejecting the Medicaid challenge 
by the states very strongly supports a denial of the opportunity to be heard on the 
merits by a participating state because since the beginning, the Medicaid Act gave 
states a warning that the program could be altered, amended, or repealed.83 Ever 
since 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1304 has continuously provided as follows: “The right to 
alter, amend, or repeal any provision of [Medicaid] . . . is hereby reserved to the 
Congress.”84 Because Congress gave the states fair warning that it was keeping the 
right to “alter, amend, or repeal” a spending program, Congress provided full notice 
of its plan to keep comprehensive and complete power to modify the program as a 
proper exercise of its legislative power over the states challenging the ACA 
Medicaid expansion and therefore, should be denied an opportunity to be heard in 
court under the equity rationale.85  
 The Supreme Court’s judgment and rationale in Bowen v. Public Agencies 
Opposed to Social Security Entrapment could serve as persuasive justification for 
applying the equity concept to deny the States an opportunity to a full hearing on the 
merits of the Medicaid expansion challenge based on spending power coercion.86 
When authorized in 1935, the Social Security Act did not include state employees.87 
Reacting to coercion from States seeking to include its employees, Congress, in 
1950, changed the Act to permit States to choose to participate in the program.88 The 
federal law granting States this initial freedom of choice deliberately allowed States 
                                                            
 82 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 83 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2638 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. (citing Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 
51-52 (1986)). 
 87 See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 44). 
 88 See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 45). 
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the right to leave the program.89 Starting in the 1970s, an expanding number of 
States used the option to depart.90  
Troubled by the fact that departures were maltreating Social Security, Congress 
repealed the termination stipulation in the law.91 Congress, by exercising its repeal 
power, changed Social Security from a voluntary plan for the States to one from 
which the States could not run away from or avoid.92 California challenged the 
repeal, claiming that the alteration was not valid because it denied California the 
right to leave the Social Security program.93 The Supreme Court unanimously 
refused to accept California’s line of reasoning.94 Because Congress incorporated in 
the Social Security Act “a clause expressly reserving to it ‘[t]he right to alter, amend, 
or repeal any provision’ of the Act,” the Supreme Court appropriately concluded that 
Congress gave the States adequate notice that the Social Security Act did not 
establish any contractual rights for the State of California or any other state.95 As a 
result, the States did not have any legal basis on which to challenge the Social 
Security amendment, even with the considerable nature of the change.96 
Fifth, in Sebelius, the Court could reject the ACA Medicaid Expansion lawsuits 
filed by the States because spending money to provide for the general welfare is part 
of the cooperative political responsibility federalism existing between Congress and 
the States. Cooperative political responsibility federalism should be construed as a 
“self-monitoring”97 process that does not truly involve economic coercion because 
no one actually forces a state to accept free money, to provide or improve healthcare 
to eligible people living in the state. While rejecting the political question doctrine, 
Professor Hinkle correctly concludes that the Court has a duty to accept the 
constitutional reality that there are political responsibilities rooted in the political 
branches—and whether and how these political duties are implemented typically 
does not present an issue for review by the courts.98 Since cooperative political 
responsibilities to promote the general welfare are a self-monitoring process, it 
should be exempt from judicial review.99When a state accepts money from the 
federal government under a Medicaid federal cooperative program, spending power 
economic coercion does not exist because a State volunteers to accept free money to 
improve the healthcare of its residents. 
The Constitution has simply not ordained judges and courts as an “ombudsmen 
for all legislative inadequacies” because the judicial resolution is not to provide a 
                                                            
 89 Id. at 2638 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 45). 
 90 See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 46). 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 48). 
 93 See id. at 2638-39 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 49-50). 
 94 See id. at 2639 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51-53). 
 95 Id. (quoting Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51-52). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Henkin, supra note 78, at 623. 
 98 Id. at 624. 
 99 See id. at 622-23.  
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helpful remedy for every injury.100 The restraint on judicial involvement does not 
depend on an unnecessary political question doctrine to withdraw from a particular 
group of cases because the separation of powers doctrine assigned political duties to 
the federal legislative and executive branches.101 The political question doctrine 
realized its glory days during the New Deal Court by Justices who were chosen to 
bring back judicial self-restraint and let those elected to Congress make the rules.102 
The issues which those New Deal Justices addressed “seemed particularly fitting for 
legislative rather than judicial rule and particularly fitting occasions to build fences 
against future judicial incursions.”103 As asserted by Justice Ginsburg in Sebelius, the 
dividing line between spending power coercion is more appropriate for legislative, 
rather than judicial, problem solving. “The coercion inquiry, therefore, appears to 
involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.”104 Selected commentators 
supportive of a vigorous application of Dole’s spending power restrictions presume 
that a theory of “impermissible coercion” based on the belief that a State apparently 
lacks the ability to turn down federal money is really and truly too extremely vague 
and unstructured to be judicially supervised.105 
 The position that the States’ overdependence on federal dollars restricts 
Congress’ power to amend or expand the Medicaid program under the Spending 
Clause is wrong because it is the constitutional responsibility of Congress and not 
the States to spend federal money to provide for the general welfare of the people.106 
Each succeeding Congress is authorized to disperse money as it considers necessary 
or proper.107 The 110th Congress was free to make a decision regarding Medicaid 
finances that modified the product produced by a prior Congress. In fact a 
succeeding Congress could deny the States money they were hopeful of receiving 
based on the action of a past Congress without violating the spending power 
coercion theory.108 To allow the States to restrict Congress’ ability to make 
subsequent changes to a conditional Medicaid grant encourages the states to 
collectively or individually use the Spending Clause to coerce Congress into 
economic submission to the States. When Congress is required by the courts to 
continue granting money to the States based on the original terms of the conditional 
grants without the ability to subsequently change the terms of the original 
conditional grant, Congress has been coerced by the States receiving the money on 
their own terms rather than the terms set by Congress. 
                                                            
 100 Id. at 624-25 
 101 Id. at 625. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2641 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 105 Id. (citing Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole, 78 IND. L. J. 459, 
521-22, n.307 (2003)). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
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In West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, the federal district court abided by the Supreme Court advice to 
lower courts to maneuver away from issues asking courts to determine when federal 
encouragement to meet the terms of a condition in a grant produces unacceptable 
coercion.109 Although Justice Roberts concluded in Sebelius that the States had 
suffered Spending Clause coercion, he also failed, like all of the other judges, to 
identify a single court that had discovered the time in which encouragement became 
coercion. 110 It is not surprising that not a single judge has been able to actually 
identify when spending power coercion has occurred because according to Professor 
Kathleen Sullivan, an empirical explanation of when coercion occurs is virtually 
impossible to ascertain.111 The federal district court appropriately refused to accept 
West Virginia’s self-serving contention that its statutory choice of participating in 
the federal estate recovery plan was unconstitutionally coerced.112 The district court 
held that the execution of an estate recovery plan as a condition of getting federal 
Medicaid dollars is permitted by the spending power.113 In Sebelius, spending power 
jurisprudence would have been well served if the Supreme Court had simply rejected 
the States’ self-serving contention that its statutory choice of participating in the 
ACA federal Medicaid expansion plan created unconstitutional coercion. The 
Supreme Court should have followed the rationale of the federal district in West 
Virginia and held that participation in the Medicaid expansion plan as a condition of 
continuing to receive federal Medicaid dollars is permitted by the spending power. 
IV. THE COURT IN SEBELIUS INCORRECTLY REFUSED TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO 
CONGRESS BY USING A TENTH AMENDMENT STATES’ RIGHTS RATIONALE TO 
CONCLUDE THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION PLAN WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
COERCIVE EXERCISE OF THE SPENDING POWER  
Public servants on behalf of twenty-six states, two non-public plaintiffs, as well 
as the National Federation of Independent Business, challenged the Medicaid 
expansion as a violation of the Tenth Amendment right of a state to be free of 
spending power coercion.114 The state plaintiffs made the claim that the Medicaid 
expansion violated both the spending power and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation 
of definite powers to the states.115 Congress is not authorized to use its spending 
power to “coerce” the states into submission with the federal objective.116 Under the 
                                                            
 109 West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2001). 
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. (citing Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1428). 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012).  
 115 Id. at 1264 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X; Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 548, 585 (1937); West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 
286-87 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 116 Id. 
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Spending Clause, the coercion test raises an issue of whether the federal plan denies 
a state a choice about meeting the conditions for receiving federal dollars and 
induces the state to take action because the state, in effect, has no other choice.117 
Initially, the coercion doctrine received significant analysis by the Supreme 
Court in Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.118 In that case, a corporation 
disputed the obligation to pay an employment tax required by the recently approved 
Social Security Act.119 The corporation contended that the federal government 
inappropriately coerced states into making a contribution to the Social Security 
program.120 The Supreme Court appropriately rejected the corporation’s challenge to 
the employment tax because the corporation failed to make a distinction between 
motive and coercion.121 Every condition placed on the receipt of money is analogous 
to a tax because to some degree, it is regulatory.122 To some extent, receiving federal 
dollars is similar to paying a tax because taxes place an economic burden on the 
activity that is taxed as compared with a similar activity that is not taxed, and state 
activity receiving federal funds may have regulatory burdens that do not apply to 
another state activity.123 Every reimbursement from a tax when based upon conduct 
is comparatively an enticement.124 However, to claim that purpose or enticement is 
equal to spending power coercion is to unnecessarily create a spending clause 
jurisprudence that is an unconstitutional stumbling block that restricts the power of 
Congress.125 Asserting that lawful purpose and enticement equals spending power 
coercion is too much a fatalistic view toward the freedom of choice in making policy 
determinations about adopting public policy to promote the general welfare.126 The 
law should be directed by a common sense understanding which presupposes that a 
freedom of choice exists between the federal government and the states on solving 
problems that are an impediment to promoting the general welfare.127 Nothing in the 
Sebelius case supports the conclusion that the federal government had exercised 
power over the states similar to undue influence. It is indeed fair to assume that the 
undue influence concept should rarely, if ever, be applied to the interaction between 
the state and federal bodies.128 “Even on that assumption the location of the point at 
which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a 
question of degree, at times, perhaps, of fact.”129 What is truly an amazing fact 
regarding Sebelius is the Supreme Court’s unilateral decision to address the ACA 
                                                            
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. (quoting Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)). 
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Medicaid expansion requirement as a spending power coercion issue because all the 
federal circuits came to the same conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was a valid 
exercise of the power of Congress.130 Although no single inferior court had 
proclaimed that the Medicaid expansion violated the constitution, the Supreme Court 
mysteriously created the spending power Medicaid expansion coercion issue and 
then approved the petition for certiorari on the Medicaid issue.131 
In Sebelius, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment functions as a check on 
Congress’ authority to spend for the general welfare once objectionable conditions 
are placed on states’ receipt of those federal payments.132 Although Sebelius will 
encourage many more novel coercion objections to federal conditional spending 
plans, the Supreme Court has left the lower courts with very little direction and 
judicially manageable standards to address future spending power litigation by 
basing coercion on a vague standard.133 The Court’s flawed spending power coercion 
theory has unnecessarily created “difficulties for lower courts attempting to decide 
coercion challenges, legislators drafting new conditional spending programs, and 
federal agencies administering existing Spending Clause programs [that] are 
profound. For every federal spending program since the Great Society, this case 
signals the beginning of a new era of litigation challenges.”134 
In Sebelius, the expanded Medicaid mandate was considered coercive because 
the Court implemented its lack of judicial deference to Congress rationale as applied 
to the Commerce Clause regulation in 1995 in United States v. Lopez135 to the federal 
spending power under the Spending Clause.136 Connecting the spending power 
coercion theory to the lack of deference to Congress’ use of its commerce clause 
power in Lopez provides a basis for understanding the lack of judicial deference to 
the power of Congress to promote cooperative federalism spending power projects. 
In Lopez, the Court believed if it were to accept the Government’s point of view 
regarding the possession of guns at school, it would be very difficult for the Court to 
conceive of any undertaking by a person that Congress does not have the power to 
regulate under its commerce power.137 In Sebelius, the Court refused to accept the 
Government’s point of view regarding the Medicaid Expansion.138 Because of a lack 
of judicial respect for Congress, it was very easy for the Court to conceive of 
Medicaid Expansion by Congress as a pragmatic coercive effort by the federal 
government to demand considerable and unforeseeable expenditures from the states 
that are currently involved in a continuing federal spending plan as a violation of the 
                                                            
 130 Huberfeld, Weeks Leonard & Outterson, supra note 29, at 30. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 6. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 136 See id. at 549. 
 137 Id. at 564. 
 138 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012). 
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spending power.139 The Sebelius coercion occurs even if the states were presented 
with the option to accept the ACA’s additional terms and conditions or leave 
Medicaid completely.140 The states, in effect, were coerced by lack of a sensible 
choice.141 In Sebelius, the Court’s conclusion that the States suffered spending power 
coercion under the Medicaid expansion exists because of the Lopez lack of judicial 
deference reality. In Lopez, the Court demonstrated a lack of judicial deference to a 
Congressional exercise of its commerce clause power.142 While in Sebelius, the 
Court followed the line of reasoning established in Lopez and did not give any 
deference to Congressional use of the spending clause power.143  
The Supreme Court‘s decisions in Lopez and Sebelius was a return to the 
rationale utilized in National League of Cities v. Usery because in those three 
judicial opinions, the Supreme Court gave the States a constitutional shield against 
specific types of federal requirements that were clearly within the reasonable scope 
of the enumerated power of Congress.144 Throughout Sebelius, the Court simply 
utilized the Tenth Amendment to justify imposing a judicially created affirmative 
restriction on the scope of the national spending power of Congress.145 In Sebelius, 
the Supreme Court took the position that the Tenth Amendment operated as a 
substantive tool to place affirmative limits on the federal spending power, even in 
the Medicaid Expansion field to which a non-coercive federal constitutional 
spending power was presumed to be real and available to Congress.146 
If the Court in Sebelius had followed Justice Blackmun’s rationale in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,147 which overruled National League of 
Cities’ approach of rejecting the “traditional governmental functions” doctrine, it 
would have concluded the spending power coercion theory did not prohibit Congress 
from giving states a choice to adopt Medicaid expansion to avoid losing its Medicaid 
funds. Professor James F. Blumstein acknowledges that Justice Blackmun 
recognized in Garcia that the traditional governmental function approach was 
inherently flawed because it failed to serve as an informative principle of Tenth 
Amendment limitations on the enumerated powers of Congress.148 Similar to the 
traditional governmental functions restriction on the Tenth Amendment States’ 
rights issue, the spending power coercion prohibition is also fatally flawed because it 
                                                            
 139 James F. Blumstein, NFIB v. Sebelius and Enforceable Limits on Federal Leveraging: 
The Contract Paradigm, the Clear Notice Rule, and the Coercion Principle, 6 J. HEALTH & 
LIFE SCI. L. 123, 135 (2013). 
 140 See id. at 129. 
 141 Id. at 137-38. 
 142 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 143 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012). 
 144 See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing 
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1283 (1994) [hereinafter Blumstein, Federalism] (citing 
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
 148 Blumstein, Federalism, supra note 144, at 1283-84. 
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is too vague to provide an informative principle of Tenth Amendment limitations on 
the enumerated Spending Clause power of Congress.  
In Garcia, Justice Blackmun, who had concurred and supplied the necessary fifth 
vote in National League of Cities, abandoned the traditional governmental function 
paradigm of National League of Cities as unreasonable and impractical, as well as 
incompatible with the customary doctrine of federalism.149 In my view, the Supreme 
Court should abandon the spending power paradigm approved in Sebelius as also 
unreasonable and impractical, as well as incompatible with the customary doctrine of 
cooperative spending power federalism as applied to Medicaid. Because the 
traditional governmental functions theory did not provide much analytical guidance 
in determining which state functions were traditional and beyond the reach of federal 
power and which state functions were not traditional and within the reach of the 
federal power, the theory was properly rejected in Garcia.150 Since the spending 
power theory in Sebelius does not provide any meaningful analytical direction in 
determining which federal expenditures for Medicaid are coercive, it fails to meet 
the criteria articulated by the Court in Dole.151 Justice Ginsburg correctly states that 
Sebelius “does not present the concerns that led the Court in Dole even to consider 
the prospect of coercion.”152 Because Sebelius is a simple case, the Court’s analysis 
is very troubling and disturbing. Congress, endeavoring to help the disadvantaged, 
has distributed federal money to financially support state health-insurance plans that 
comply with federal standards.153 The major requirement that the ACA establishes is 
that the state plan expands to include adults earning no more than 133% of the 
federal poverty level.154 Imposing that requirement guarantees that federal dollars 
will be spent on health care for the economically disadvantaged in order to advance 
Congress’ contemporary observation of the general welfare.155 
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD APPLY THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST FOR DECIDING 
WHETHER CONGRESS CREATED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL COERCIVE CONDITION IN 
VIOLATION OF THE SPENDING POWER BY REQUIRING A PARTICIPATING STATE TO 
ACCEPT REASONABLE FEDERAL CHANGES THAT PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE 
A simple application of the rational basis test to determine if spending power 
coercion exists would presume that it is generally conceivable that a State would 
voluntarily accept federal dollars to advance or promote the general welfare of its 
citizens and that the State’s acceptance of conditional federal Medicaid grants is 
entitled to a strong presumption that its acceptance of the grant does not produce 
spending power coercion or a violation of States’ rights. In my opinion, the rationale 
articulated by Justice Souter to support the application of the rational basis theory in 
                                                            
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. at 1284-85. 
 151 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634-35 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 152 Id. at 2634. 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. at 2634-35.  
 155 Id. 
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the context of the enumerated commerce clause power is equally applicable to a 
Spending Clause analysis.156 In reviewing congressional legislation under either the 
Commerce Clause or the Spending Clause, the Court should defer to an express or 
implicit congressional finding that its law focuses on a topic substantially promoting 
the general welfare or affecting interstate commerce if providing any rational basis 
to support such a finding by Congress.157 The tradition of deferring to rationally 
established legislative reasoning “is a paradigm of judicial restraint.”158 In Sebelius, 
judicial review as a tool of judicial restraint under the Spending Clause would have 
demonstrated the Court’s “respect for the institutional competence of the Congress 
on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the 
legitimacy that comes from Congress’ political accountability in dealing with 
matters open to a wide range of possible choices.”159 In Sebelius, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ refusal to apply the rational basis test to Congress’ exercise of its spending 
power demonstrated a lack of “respect for the competence and primacy of Congress 
in matters” promoting the nation’s general welfare in the area of healthcare by 
unsustainably increasing its theory of judicial review while disparaging a proper 
exercise of the congressional spending power.160 Since before Sebelius, the Supreme 
Court had never held that coercion actually violated the spending clause, 
demonstrating how Sebelius dangerously rolled back the enumerated power of 
Congress.161 The Sebelius spending power rationale suggests that the Court has an 
excessive judicial appetite for expanding a style of judicial review that undermines 
judicial deference because it invites future litigants to challenge the spending power 
of Congress unless Congress can at least demonstrate a substantial justification for 
its exercise of the spending power.162 
In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts energized and expanded the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism, with its central goal of  rolling back of national power of Congress while 
simultaneously expanding state’s rights.163 Under the rationale of Sebelius, the 
Rehnquist Court’s goal of reducing national power has been expanded to include the 
spending power.164 Before Sebelius, the spending power was generally recognized as 
                                                            
 156 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 157 Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 
(1981); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); see Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 
(1964))). 
 158 Id. at 604 (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 
314 (1993). 
 159 Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 
(1981); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147, 151-54 (1938); cf. 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)). 
 160 See id. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See id.  
 163 See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 
78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003). 
 164 See id. 
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the notable exception to the Supreme Court’s rollback of the national power by 
Congress because of the Court’s decision in Dole.165 As a result of Dole, several 
analysts and pundits advanced the political and constitutional theory that spending 
power legislation would roll back a states‘ rights federalism that actually 
compromises the power of Congress.166  
Those analysts and pundits who believed that Congress could enact legislation 
under Dole without committing spending power coercion reasonably relied on the 
fact that the majority of the lower courts had concluded that spending coercion under 
Dole could occur only if a state could demonstrate it had “no practical choice.”167 If a 
state could refuse the condition and nevertheless carry on in actual fact as a state, 
then receiving the condition creates a freedom of choice, and the condition should 
not be treated as unacceptably coercive.168 The view that a state demonstrate that it 
cannot survive as a state in order for spending power coercion to exist is very 
consistent with the precedents that are the basis for the decision in Dole.169 In 
Sebelius, the Court energized enumerated power rollback supporters by applying a 
vague spending coercion theory that gave considerably less deference to Congress 
than Dole.170 In order to aggressively implement its enumerated powers rollback in 
favor of the states and at the expense of Congress, the Court in Sebelius implicitly 
adopted the position that a spending condition is improperly coercive if it is 
conceivable that a state could believe it had either no rational choice or no fair 
choice but to accept the money.171 By not applying the rational basis standard, the 
Supreme Court in Sebelius adopted the rationale that the spending condition which 
placed a state at risk of losing all of its Medicaid money if it refused to participate in 
Medicaid expansion created spending coercion because it was conceivable that the 
state had no practical choice.172 However, since it was conceivable in Sebelius that a 
                                                            
 165 See id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). 
 166 See id. (citing Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the 
Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 51-52 (2003)). 
 167 Id. at 520.  
 168 See id. at 520 n.302 (citing Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“According to the coercion theory, the federal government may not, at least in certain 
circumstances, condition the receipt of funds in such a way as to leave the state with no 
practical alternative but to comply with federal restrictions.”)). 
 169 Id. at 520 (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937) 
(“There must be a showing in the second place that the tax and the credit in combination are 
weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states.” After concluding 
that the tax was not coercive, the court stated, “[t]he statute does not call for a surrender by the 
states of powers essential to their quasi sovereign existence.”)). 
 170 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 171 See id. at 2604-07. 
 172 See Baker & Berman, supra note 163, at 520-21 n.305 (“A decade prior to Dole, one 
scholar objected that ‘[d]ebating whether conditions on federal grants . . . ‘coerce’ the state is 
an unhelpful anthropomorphism. . . . The question . . . is not whether federal requirements 
overbear on a hypostasized state ‘free will,’ but whether they unduly compromise a normative 
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State had a practical, but hard, choice not to expand Medicaid as required under the 
ACA and lose all of its other Medicaid funding under the rational basis test, the 
Supreme Court should have deferred to Congress under the rational basis standard 
and upheld the ACA’s Medicaid expansion requirement. 
In Sebelius, the Court abandoned the rational basis standard of review in order to 
limit the reach of the federal spending power based on a spending power coercion 
rationale that is so vague that it is impractical.173 Because the Roberts Court is 
committed to a rollback of the enumerated powers of Congress, the Court no longer 
applies the rational basis standard to either the commerce power or spending power 
when a State challenges legislation enacted by Congress.174 The Court in Sebelius 
resolved the Medicaid Expansion issue by abandoning the rationality rule in order to 
support its spending power coercion theory.175 The intended enumerated power 
rollback effect of the vague Sebelius coercion theory is to deny deference to 
Congress. Even if it is conceivable that a state could make a hard choice to lose all of 
its Medicaid funding and reasonably believe that a total loss of its Medicaid money 
does not equal a total coercive destruction of the state by the federal government, the 
Supreme Court’s conclusory coercion analysis in Sebelius unreasonably suggests 
that Congress has robbed the state of its right to continue to exist.176  
When the issue of how to adjust the standard of judicial review occurred during 
the 2012 challenges by states to the Medicaid Expansion, the Roberts Court 
invalidated the expansion under a vague Spending Clause coercion theory. 177 In the 
process of treating the Medicaid expansion as an act of spending power coercion, the 
Roberts’ Court repudiated Court precedent by refusing to defer to Congress’ 
judgment on how to use its spending power to promote the general welfare.178 The 
judicial “matching” of the permissible conditions that Congress may place on federal 
grants is the functional equivalent of elevating the degree of formal judicial scrutiny 
required by the Court for its approval of spending power legislation.179 The Court 
utilized an incomprehensibly vague spending power coercion theory in Sebelius. The 
vague spending power theory implemented by the Court in Sebelius ignores the 
rational basis standard and arbitrarily places a “direct” limit on a reasonable use of 
the spending power by Congress to promote the general welfare.180  
In an unsuccessful 1937 lawsuit filed by the Charles C. Steward Machine 
Company against Harwell G. Davis, individually and as a Collector of Internal 
Revenue for the District of Alabama challenging the validity of the tax imposed by 
the Social Security Act of 1935 on employers of eight or more, the Court gave 
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deference to Congress under the rational basis standard.181 The Social Security Act 
of August 14, 1935 is separated into eleven distinct titles.182 The heading for Title IX 
is “Tax on Employers of Eight or More.”183 Each employer (with indicated 
exclusions) is to pay every calendar year “an excise tax, with respect to having 
individuals in his employ,” the tax is to be calculated by prearranged percentages of 
the sum of the wages payable by the employer throughout the calendar year in the 
course of said employment.184  
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts’ treatment of the Medicaid Expansion in Sebelius, 
Justice Cardozo rejected the coercion-theory attack on the Social Security Act of 
1935.185 Justice Cardozo correctly concluded that “[t]he excise tax is not void as 
involving the coercion of the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment or of 
restrictions implicit in our federal form of government.”186 The states failed to 
demonstrate that the Medicaid Expansion was being utilized as “weapons of 
coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states.”187 Justice Cardozo, 
unlike Chief Justice Roberts, would likely not have found a spending power coercion 
violation in Sebelius. Justice Cardozo believed in order to intelligently distinguish 
between coercion and encouragement, courts would be wise to defer to Congress 
when using the spending power to rationally establish fiscal and economic policy to 
promote the general welfare of the American people.188 In the presence of an urgent 
need for a remedial measure to help the nation control healthcare cost while 
simultaneously expanding Medicaid coverage to the economically-challenged, the 
question to be answered is whether the Medicaid Expansion measure adopted by 
Congress exceeded the scope of the spending power. Justice Cardozo rejected the 
argument that the1935 Social Security Act placed “the state Legislatures under the 
whip of economic pressure” that was so great that the state had no practical choice 
but to ratify the unemployment compensation laws directed by the federal 
government.189 Justice Cardozo correctly concluded that the federal unemployment 
compensation laws did not create an unconstitutional coercion that violated the 
Tenth Amendment’s implicit limits on coercive federalism.190 If Chief Justice 
Roberts in Sebelius had followed the early logic used by Justice Cardozo, he would 
have rejected the contention that because the ACA was designed to force the state 
Legislatures under the whip of economic pressure to adopt Medicaid Expansion as 
commanded by Congress, the expansion created unconstitutional spending power 
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coercion.191 In rejecting the approach taken by Justice Cardozo, Chief Justice 
Roberts apparently believes that the Medicaid Expansion provision is also a 
violation of the Tenth Amendment or other limitations implicit in the his rollback 
model of federalism.192 Supporters of the Medicaid Expansion rightfully contend that 
its operation is not a constraint because like the Social Security Act of 1935 that was 
found valid by the Court, it expands the freedom of both the states and the nation by 
allowing them to join in a co-operative endeavor to solve shared problems.193 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius dramatically changed the Medicaid 
expansion authority of Congress and unnecessarily created a confusing spending 
power coercion landscape for courts and others trying to determine the impact of 
Sebelius on any future attempt by Congress to expand or otherwise modify existing 
Medicaid Legislation. The Supreme Court should reverse its Medicaid expansion 
holding in Sebelius and return to the rationale it adopted more than seventy-five 
years ago when it refused to limit congressional spending power based on a slippery 
slope coercion theory. 
Since Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning is not clear and provides no significant 
criteria by which to determine coerciveness, I believe the future impact of the 
opinion is fairly easy to predict. In view of the fact that Roberts’ reasoning is not 
clear and provides no criteria by which to determine coerciveness, everyone may 
easily predict that there will be many legal challenges to the Medicaid expansion 
analysis provided by Chief Justice Roberts. Chief Justice Roberts’ Medicaid 
expansion coercion theory is seriously flawed because it is vague and fails to 
adequately identify either the total sum or proportion of federal money at risk of 
being denied or fails to properly measure when substantive changes to the Medicaid 
program actually create unconstitutional coercion. Chief Justice Roberts’ coercion 
rationale in Sebelius demonstrates that he has joined those who support a hostile 
brand of federalism that is designed to roll back the power of Congress to promote 
the general welfare of all Americans, including adults without any healthcare care 
coverage. 
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